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IT · Seminar 02 · Protecting data while it is being used

Confidential Computing and Trusted Execution Environments

Confidential computing encrypts data in use inside hardware-isolated trusted execution environments, closing the last gap left by encryption at rest and in transit.

confidential computingTEEenclaveattestationSGX/SEV

We routinely encrypt data at rest (on disk) and in transit (over the network), but during processing data must be decrypted in memory — where a compromised OS, hypervisor or cloud operator could read it. Confidential computing closes this gap by protecting data in use inside a hardware-enforced Trusted Execution Environment (TEE).

Working principle

A TEE is an isolated region of the CPU whose memory is encrypted and inaccessible even to privileged software (kernel, hypervisor). Code and data run inside this enclave; the processor enforces the boundary. Crucially, remote attestation lets a TEE prove to a third party exactly what code is running inside it before any secret is released — establishing trust without trusting the host. Examples include Intel SGX/TDX, AMD SEV-SNP and Arm CCA.

cannot readquoteverifyrelease secretUntrusted host (OS, hypervisor)TEE / enclave (encrypted memory)Attestation serviceData ownerHardware-isolated enclave with remote attestation
Figure 1. The enclave's memory is opaque to the host; attestation proves the running code before the owner entrusts it with secrets.
Table 1. Three states of data protection
StateThreatProtection
At restStolen diskDisk / DB encryption
In transitNetwork sniffingTLS
In useCompromised hostConfidential computing (TEE)
Why it mattersConfidential computing enables privacy-preserving collaboration: parties can pool sensitive data for joint computation without any of them — or the cloud — seeing the others' raw inputs.

Applications

  • Processing regulated data (health, finance) in public cloud
  • Multi-party analytics and confidential AI inference
  • Protecting keys and proprietary models at runtime

References & further reading

  1. Confidential Computing Consortium, “A Technical Analysis of Confidential Computing,” 2021.
  2. Costan & Devadas, “Intel SGX Explained,” IACR ePrint, 2016.
  3. Sabt et al., “Trusted Execution Environment: What It is, and What It is Not,” IEEE TrustCom, 2015.